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appear to be particularly applicable in cases where no effort has been
made by police officers to secure a warrant or to independently
corroborate the information.
In Thompson the facts fit the mold of Spinelli; therefore, the holding
appears to be well founded. However, the Thompson variation, while
minor, is still one that might lead to a major deprivation of a defend-
ant's fourth amendment rights. Since the reliability of an unnamed
criminal informant is at best suspect, if his information is to be used, it
should be subjected to the rigid tests dictated by Aquilar and Spinelli.
Steven Aaron Allen
FEDERAL TAXATION-TAXPAYER HELD TO HAVE BENEFICIAL
INTEREST AND TO QUALIFY FOR DEPRECIATION DEDUCTION
WHERE HE MADE LITTLE INVESTMENT AND INCURRED NO
LIABILITY AS MAJORITY SHAREHOLDER OF A CORPORATION
AND TRANSFEREE SUBSEQUENT TO PURCHASE-LEASE BACK
AND MORTGAGE AGREEMENTS. BOLGER V. COMMISSIONER,
59 T.C. 760 (1973).
May a corporation be created to buy industrial property, lease the
property back to the seller, mortgage the property using the lease as
security and then convey the property to the incorporator thus pro-
viding a liability free depreciation deduction to that taxpayer?
The Tax Court answered yes in Bolger v. Commissioner.' There the
court approved a scheme which allowed the taxpayer and his associates
to hold commercial property with most of the advantages and few of
the headaches. The court considered two basic issues: (1) whether the
financing corporation is a separate viable entity or merely a conduit for
the property owner; and (2) if the corporate entity is recognized,
whether the taxpayer acquires a depreciable interest from it. An affirm-
ative answer was given to both by application of the Internal Revenue
Code of 1954 (the "Code"), § 167, allowing depreciation for property
used in trade or business to the taxpayer, and § 1011, adjusting the
basis by including an unpaid mortgage balance. The Tax Court held that
despite the circuitous land transactions divesting the corporation of its
sole assets, it engaged in sufficient business activity to be recognized as
a viable entity.2 The taxpayer was entitled to a depreciable interest in
the property because he and the other transferees had acquired legal
title and the beneficial ownership by virtue of the transfer. The out-
standing debt obligation of the mortgage was recognized by the court as
1. 59 T.C. 760 (1973).
2. Id. at 766.
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the fair market value of the property and accepted as Bolger's basis
despite the absence of his personal liability.
3
David Bolger (the taxpayer) negotiated, in ten similar transactions,
with a manufacturing or industrial concern to sell its property to a
financing corporation established by him. This corporation was set up
to lease the property back to the seller and then sell its own negotiable
interest bearing notes in the amount of the purchase price to a commer-
cial lender in a mortgage form.4 The lease payments were aligned with
the mortgage payments which in turn went directly from the lessee to
the mortgagor, bypassing the corporation. The corporate shareholders,
Bolger always being one, would then have the property conveyed from
the corporation to themselves for the nominal sum of one dollar. This
process permitted Bolger to: (1) obtain a loan for the purchase price
thereby avoiding state usury restrictions on individual borrowers,' (2)
shield himself from any liability, (3) create transferable fractional
interests, (4) increase the marketability of the financing, and (5) deduct
the property depreciation in his personal tax return.
Both the majority and minority in Bolger accepted the financing
corporation as a corporate entity. Judge Tannewald's majority opinion
showed little reservation in characterizing the financing corporation as
"viable," noting its actions of buying, selling and mortgaging the
property as satisfying the business activity test established by Moline
Properties, Inc. v. Commissioners.6 In that case the doctrine of corpo-
rate entity caused the questionable corporation, established by an
individual who conveyed existing mortgages in return for all but the
qualifying shares of stock, to be recognized as a "tax identity," because
it discharged existing mortgages, and both rented and sold parts of the
realty. In Moline, the Court saw no reason to disregard the corporate
form and to consider it identifiable with the petitioner. On the other
3. Id.
4. Both parties treated all ten transactions as if there were no significant differences, thus all
references herein will be made in the singular. The price of each transaction when
completed was one dollar.
5. Some states limit the interest rate for which an individual may contract but do not subject
a corporation to such restrictions, e.g., N.Y. GEN. OBLIGATIONS LAW § 5-501 (McKinney
1964); N.J. REV. STAT. § 31:1-1 (1973). Maryland law provides no such impediment. Art.
49, § 5 exempts all commercial loans in excess of $5,000 from Maryland usury regulations
regardless of the nature of the contracting parties. Cf. B.F. Saul Co. v. West End Park, 250
Md. 707, 721, 246 A.2d 591, 600 (1968). Other advantages cited in the text indicate that it
may be desirable to form a corporation. The sale-lease back formula being a purchase
transaction, also escapes usury restrictions limiting the amount of a loan to a percentage of
the appraisal value of the borrower company. Thus, the company can obtain capital
equivalent to the price generated by the sale. E.g., N.Y. INSUR. LAW § 87 (McKinney 1964).
6. 319 U.S. 436 (1943). The Moline Court stated:
The doctrine of corporate entity fills a useful purpose in business life. Whether
the purpose be to gain an advantage under the law of the state of incorporation or to
avoid or to comply with the demands of creditors or to serve the creator's personal
or undisclosed convenience, so long as that purpose is the equivalent of business
activity or is followed by the carrying on of business by the corporation, the corpo-
ration remains a separate taxable entity.
Id. at 438-39 (citations omitted).
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hand, the taxpayer argued that the facts of O'Neill v. Commissioner,7
where corporations were formed to avoid the need to obtain the wife's
signature in land transactions, and Jackson v. Commission,' where the
sole purpose of two corporations was for the wife to hold property free
of the husband's creditors, were analogous to the function of the
present financing corporation and required the corporate form to be
disregarded for tax purposes. The Bolger court disagreed and held that
the financing corporation engaged in substantial business activity with a
function considerably more active than a mere shell holding title to
property, as was found to be the case in O'Neill and Jackson.9
In Bolger the taxpayer, seeking to establish his right to depreciation
over that of the corporation, argued to have it recognized as his agent
or nominee. Several exceptions to the doctrine of corporate entity were
noted in Moline,' 0 and the taxpayer relied upon the one established in
Southern Pacific Co. v. Lowe,' ' which disregarded the corporate form
where the corporation was the agent of the owner. The Southern
Pacific Company solely owned and controlled the Central Pacific Rail-
road Company. The latter accumulated a considerable surplus con-
sisting primarily of debits against the former. Central Pacific declared a
stock dividend and the Commissioner ruled it to be income to Southern
Pacific, which was the sole stockholder. The Supreme Court reversed
and held that in reality the two companies were merged and that the
dividend was no more than a paper transfer between two funds con-
trolled by Southern Pacific. The rationale of Southern Pacific possesses
only limited persuasive power for Bolger's case because the Supreme
Court held that Southern Pacific turned on "its very peculiar facts"' 2
and should be distinguished from cases where one seeks to identify his
interest with a corporation. In Bolger the Tax Court rejected the
agency-nominee argument without commenting, but a reading of the
cases cited in the decision results in the same conclusion. National
Carbide Corp. v. Commissioner' 3 discussed the fallacy of the agency
exception and declined to accept as one a corporation and its subsidiary
corporation because an analysis of the facts' ' showed that the subsid-
7. 170 F.2d 596 (2d Cir. 1948).
8. 233 F.2d 289 (2d Cir. 1956).
9. 59 T.C. at 766.
10. 319 U.S. 436, 439 (1943).
11. 247 U.S. 330 (1918).
12. Id. at 339. Gulf Oil Corp. v. Lewellyn, 248 U.S. 71 (1918), is cited in Moline as disregarding
the corporation form in favor of an agency relationship where a dividend was ruled to be
mere "bookkeeping." 319 U.S. at 439.
13. 336 U.S. 422 (1949).
14. Subsidiary-owned assets approximated $22 million, net sales of $20 million and earnings
approaching $4.5 million. The Court said:
What we have said does not foreclose a true corporate agent or trustee from
handling the property and income of its owner-principal without being taxable
therefor. Whether the corporation operates in the name and for the account of the
principal, binds the principal by its actions, transmits money received to the
principal, and whether receipt of income is attributable to the services of employees
of the principal and to assets belonging to the principal are some of the relevant
[Vol. 3
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iary did not perform the duties of an agent. The Bolger court observed
that in Taylor v. Commissioner,"s where a corporation borrowed
money, mortgaged property and entered buy-sell agreements, it had
conducted sufficient business activity to forestall the agency exception.
Similar reasoning was applied in Paymar v. Commissioner 6 where two
closely owned property-holding corporations were formed solely to
deter creditors. There the court was satisfied that the one securing a
$50,000 loan fulfilled the business activity test while the second was
ruled a sham, being but a passive dummy which merely held property
titles. In order to establish that his transaction came within the agency
exception, Bolger had the burden of showing that the sole business
purpose of the corporation was the carrying on of the normal duties of
an agent.' 1
However, after the corporation transferred the property (being the
extent of its assets) to Bolger and his associates, the court still found
continuing business activity of a corporate entity because the corpora-
tion was required by the lease,' 8 mortgage and transfer agreements to
remain in existence, acting as a liability shield and preserving its powers
under state laws to own property and transact business.' 9
Once the majority concluded that the corporation should be recog-
nized as a viable entity, the court considered whether Bolger was
entitled to a deduction for depreciation. The Commissioner argued that
Bolger, as transferee, acquired only a reversionary interest in the build-
ings and thus had no present interest which could be depreciated. The
argument was predicated on the view that by the long term leases and
financing transactions the corporation had divested itself of everything
but bare legal title and thus had no depreciable interest which could be
considerations in determining whether a true agency exists. If the corporation is a
true agent, its relations with its principal must not be dependent upon the fact that
it is owned by the principal, if such is the case. Its business purpose must be the
carrying on of the normal duties of an agent. Absence of the factors mentioned
above, and the essentiality of ownership of the corporation to the existence of any
"agency" relationship in the Moline Properties, Commonwealth Improvement Co.
and Southern Pacific cases indicates the fallacy of the agency argument made in
those cases.
Id. at 437-38 (citations omitted). The agency exception was similarly rejected in Harrison
Property Management Co., Inc. v. United States, 475 F.2d 623 (Ct. Cl. 197:3), because the
agent -corporation would not have made oil lease agreements had the so-called principals
not been its owners.
15. 445 F.2d 455 (1st Cir. 1971).
16. 150 F.2d 334 (2d Cir. 1945).
17. The Court in National Carbide sets out some basic characteristics of a true agency:
[It] operates in the name and for the account of the principal, binds the
principal by its actions, transmits money received to the principal, and whether
receipt of income is attributable to the services of employees of the principal and to
the assets belonging to the principal ....
336 U.S. at 437 (citations omitted).
18. The "net" lease form was used making lessee responsible for maintenance, taxes, repairs
and insurance.
19. Subsequent to the transfer, the corporation participated in the refinancing of the San
Antonio property thus conducting its on-going business purpose.
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transferred to Bolger. The majority rejected this argument and con-
cluded that Bolger had acquired full legal and beneficial ownership.
Judge Tannenwald declared the lease to be a beneficial interest belong-
ing to the corporation from the inception of the sale-lease back, saying
that the lease served merely as security for the mortgage. 2 0 In accept-
ing Bolger's right to depreciation, the majority found further support in
the Commissioner's contention that the corporation was accountable
for the rental income. The court ruled this argument to be logically
inconsistent with the Commissioner's contention that the corporation
was devoid of a transferable interest, for if the corporation held an
interest which produced income it certainly had a depreciable interest
which it could transfer.2
The possibility of the lessee (the original owner) being entitled to the
depreciation was also ruled out by the Bolger court. The Commissioner
argued that the present transaction was analogous to World Publishing
Co. v. Commissioner,' 2 where the taxpayer having purchased property
subject to a lease was denied the depreciation deduction for a building
constructed by the lessee because the landlord made no investment in
the capital improvement. If adopted here, Bolger would not have a
depreciable interest because the lessor-corporation would have had
none to transfer. However the court rejected this reasoning saying
simply that the parties had stipulated that the lessee was not entitled to
the depreciation. Also, the court distinguished World Publishing Co.
from Bolger because in the former the lessee's beneficial interest was
clearly evident by his construction of the building being depreciated,
whereas in the latter the court held the corporation-lessor had the
beneficial ownership. 23
Having determined that Bolger was subject to tax liability on the
rental income and hence entitled to the depreciation deduction, the
court next considered what the basis for his depreciation was to be. The
unpaid balance of the unassumed mortgage was accepted by the major-
ity as the fair market value of the depreciable property.2 4 The question
raised then was whether the unpaid balance could properly be consid-
ered part of the taxpayer's basis since Bolger had no personal liability
on the mortgage. Section 167(G) provides for the depreciation to be
determined in accord with the adjustment procedures prescribed for the
gain on sale or other disposition of property under Code § 1011. The
purchase price is generally accepted as the basis in fixing the gain or loss
on the sale of property.2 s The ownership of property does not guaran-
tee a right to depreciation. 2 6 To gain a deduction for depreciation the
taxpayer must establish that he is incurring an economic loss by wear
20. 59 T.C. at 768.
21. Id.
22. 229 F.2d 614 (8th Cir. 1962).
23. Id. at 769.
24. Id.
25. Treas. Reg. § 1.1012-1 (1960).




and deterioration of his business property.2 7 The court stated that in
view of the nominal consideration paid by Bolger and the absence of
any liability, Bolger's situation was governed by Crane v. Commis-
sioner.2 8 In that case, Beulah Crane inherited an apartment building
subject to a mortgage. By agreement with the mortgagee, Mrs. Crane
continued to collect the rent, to reserve part for tax payments and to
direct the net to the mortgagee, without assuming any liability on the
mortgage. When the mortgagee threatened to foreclose, Crane sold the
property subject to the mortgage. The Crane court determined that the
taxpayer's basis for establishing the amount realized on the sale was the
unpaid balance of the mortgage despite the lack of Mrs. Crane's per-
sonal liability for the mortgage payments.2 9
In applying the Crane doctine, the Bolger court, having earlier
recognized the fair market value of the property to be equal to the
remaining principal balance of the mortgage, considered the Commis-
sioner's argument that the liability-free mortgage should only be al-
lowed as Bolger's basis if he had a real economic investment in the
property which he would seek to protect should mortgage foreclosure
be threatened. The Commissioner argued that Bolger's nominal cash
investment acquired no real interest. The majority refuted this reason-
ing by pointing out that Bolger did have an interest to protect. That
interest was represented by Bolger's equity. As the rent payments
retired the mortgage debt, Bolger received an ever increasing benefit
which could be realized as a gain on the sale on his interest. Also,
Bolger had an interest in any appreciation of the fair market value of
the property. The Bolger court realized that the effect of this applica-
tion of Crane allows an investor to recoup an investment for which he
has laid out no cash and concluded by saying, "petitioner's case should
not be treated differently merely because his acquisition of the prop-
erty is completely financed and because his cash flow is minimal." 3
Judge Quealy's dissent does not challenge the corporate existence
but does assert that it is the corporation which should be held
accountable for the income and is entitled to the depreciation. He
directly disputes Bolger's beneficial ownership:
To put the matter simply having transferred its entire interest in
the lease-hold to a trustee to collect the rents and pay its
indebtedness, I would regard the documents purporting to
transfer the property to the petitioner and his associates as
carrying no present interest. The petitioner had no present
interest in the property which was subject to depreciation.3 '
27. Commissioner v. Moore, 207 F.2d 265 (9th Cir. 1953).
28. 331 U.S. 1(1947).
29. The Crane doctrine has not been limited to inheritance questions. Commissioner v. Korell,
339 U.S. 619. 628 (1950); First National Industries. Inc. v. Commissioner, 404 F.2d 1182,
1186 (6th Cir. 1968); Harsh Investment Corp. v. United States, 323 F. Supp. 409, 412 (D.
Ore. 1970).
30. 59 T.C. at 771.
31. Id. at 775.
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Had this line of reasoning been adopted by the majority, the Crane
doctrine would have been inapplicable, since the corporation is the
party subject to liability on the mortgage. Judge Quealy relied on M.
Dematteo Construction Co. v. United States.3 2 There the taxpayer
purchased property which was subject to a lease and upon which the
lessee had constructed a building. The useful life of the building was
found to have expired before the taxpayer gained possession, so the
purchaser could not acquire a depreciable interest. Bolger can be
initially distinguished from DeMatteo in that the leases of the former
will culminate at a time when some useful life of the building remains.
DeMatteo is in conflict with World Publishing Co. v. Commissioner,3"
which held that it was illogical, for purposes of determining depreciable
interest, to emphasize an historical fact (i.e. whether the lessor or the
lessees constructed the building) which was neither participated in nor
caused by the purchaser and which was of no economic consequence to
him.3 4 While World Publishing has been criticized 3 " and is contrary to
some recognized authority,3 6 it nevertheless deserves weight equal to
DeMatteo because the World Publishing court reasoned realistically that
the taxpayer-purchaser in making the investment was not concerned
with whether the lessee or the lessor had the depreciable interest; he
was only concerned with acquiring an investment subject to deprecia-
tion. The World Publishing court concluded that the purchaser had
bought a building which was a wasting asset and depreciation was
therefore warranted.
Bolger's case is significant in that the Tax Court has recognized the
legitimacy of a depreciation deduction as an incentive to the organizer
of a sale-lease back transaction. This method of off-balance sheet
financing has had a substantial impact on tax revenue to the govern-
ment because many high income bracket taxpayers have been taking
large depreciation deductions such as Bolger succeeded in claiming here.
Sale-lease back transactions have become a fashionable financing method
because they provide an attractive alternative to raising cash by mort-
gaging property and because they result in significant tax benefits to
both parties. The outright sale of the business property allows the
company to obtain more capital than might be otherwise raised through
mortgage financing because state usury restrictions often limit the
amount of a loan to a percentage of the appraised value of the
company.3 The credit of the company and the property to be ac-
quired are the elements evaluated by the financier in determining the
32. 433 F.2d 1263 (1st Cir. 1970).
33. 299 F.2d 614 (8th Cir. 1962).
34. Id. at 622.
35. Comment, Depreciation of Tenant-Erected Building by Purchaser of Fee, 23 MD. L. REV.
353 (1963); Note, Taxation-Depreciation of Tenant-Erected Improvements by Purchaser-
Lessor, 1963 Wis. L. REV. 484; 76 HARV. L. REV. 1303 (1963).
36. 4 MERTEN, LAW OF FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION § 23.90 (1966).
37. Cary, Corporate Financing through the Sale and Lease-Back of Property: Business, Tax,
and Policy Considerations, 62 HARV. L. REV. 1, 2 (1948).
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quality of the investment.3 8 The purchaser, usually a land-investment
trust or an insurance company, buys the property and then enters into a
long term lease with the seller for a rent based on the amortization of
the purchase price and an agreed rate of return.3 The seller-lessee can
now claim a deduction for the rental payments. This amount is substan-
tially greater than the deductions available had the property been
mortgaged because a borrower can only deduct the interest on the loan
payments and the depreciation of the property. The main advantage to
the buyer-lessor is the acquisition of a secure investment with a long
term fixed return.4 Of course, the rental payments will be treated as
income to the purchaser under § 61 of the Code.
The result of these financing transactions is that Bolger will initially
realize a substantial tax saving. The total depreciation and interest rate
deductions will, at the outset, exceed the tax on the rental income,
thereby resulting in sheltered income. However, the tax shelter advan-
tages of this transaction will diminish once the deductions for interest
and depreciation have decreased to an amount that will not cancel out
the fixed rental income. Bolger will surely wish to dispose of the
property before the tax shelter begins to collapse. This disposition will
also result in possible detrimental tax consequences to Bolger in the
form of depreciation recapture. However, a discussion of these conse-
quences is beyond the scope of this note.
There is no real paradox present in adjusting Bolger's basis by an
amount equal to the mortgage, despite the fact that he did not assume
it, thereby allowing depreciation based on the face amount. Likewise
the holding that no gain has been realized upon transfer is logical, since
the gain is merely postponed until the mortgage is discharged. Bolger
will realize a taxable gain either when the rental payments erase the
encumbrance or when he sells the property pursuant to his powers
under the assumption agreement entered into at the time of the
nominal sale.
While perhaps not representing a landmark decision in tax law, the
Bolger case is significant in its recognition that such sophisticated
transactions as involved here are permissible within the present tax
scheme.
Herbert R. O'Conor III
38. S. MCMICHAEL & P. O'KEEFE, LEASES; PERCENTAGE, SHORT AND LONG TERM 108 (5th Ed.
1959).
39. Id. at 111.
40. Id. at 109.
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